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International Variability in Biofuel Trade:  
An Assessment of the Impact of U.S. Policies 
 
Abstract 
Although the United States has typically been in a position to import ethanol, corn-
based ethanol exports are surging as the domestic market becomes saturated and 
world prices rise due to high prices for sugar, the competing global feedstock. The 
U.S. is now the world’s leading ethanol producer but domestic demand is 
constrained because of technical limitations in the current vehicle fleet. Higher 
ethanol blends have been approved for use (15% rather than 10%) but a limited 
number of vehicles that can use such higher blends. Infrastructure constraints also 
affect the potential supply of higher ethanol blends. As a result of these factors, U.S. 
biofuel policies can have significant implications for the world ethanol market. 
Usage mandates under the Renewable Fuel Standard, blender tax credits, and the 
blend wall can interact to generate excess supplies of ethanol that are likely to be 
diverted to the world market. This paper examines how fluctuations in corn yield and 
gasoline prices affect the excess supply of U.S. corn-based ethanol in the presence of 
alternative assumptions about the maximum amount of ethanol that can be consumed 
domestically. Using stochastic simulations we also explore the impact of current 
policies on the mean and variance of export supply. The results highlight the 
complex interaction between technological constraints, economic incentives, and 
government policies in the U.S. biofuels sector, and point to the potentially 
destabilizing effect of such policies in international markets. 
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1.   Introduction 
Since the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the ethanol industry in 
the United States, based primarily on maize (corn) as a feedstock, has expanded 
dramatically with a roughly three-fold increase in ethanol production. Proponents of 
ethanol advocate its use on several grounds, such as reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, improving energy security, increasing farm incomes, and job creation. 
The major U.S. policy instruments to promote domestic ethanol use are tax credits 
for blending the product with gasoline, an import tariff on fuel ethanol, and the 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) which requires minimum usage levels for renewable 
fuels. In addition to these policy instruments, there has been an increase in demand 
for ethanol due to higher gasoline prices and the ban on the use of MTBE (Methyl 
Tertiary-Butyl Ether) as an oxygenate to reduce air pollution. Ethanol is a substitute 
for MTBE in this respect. Increases in corn yields and improved efficiency in corn-
to-ethanol conversion technology have also contributed to the development of the 
industry. 
Prior to the rapid growth in the domestic industry the United States was an 
importer of ethanol, mainly from Caribbean countries and Brazil, though imported 
fuel ethanol accounted for only small part of total U.S. ethanol consumption due to a 
tariff rate quota for Caribbean supplies and tariffs applied to other supplies. However, 
the nation is quickly evolving into a net exporter of fuel ethanol (RFA, 2010a). A 
major factor in this development is the saturation of the domestic market due to a so-
called “blend wall” – a limit on the maximum amount of ethanol that can be 
consumed domestically due to technical limitations in the current vehicle fleet 
(Wisner, 2010). High world sugar prices have caused tighter sugar-based export 3 
 
supplies of ethanol from Brazil. The U.S. industry has also benefited from cost 
reductions in ethanol production. Since the U.S. is now the world’s leading ethanol 
producer and faces constraints on domestic usage due to the blend wall, U.S. biofuel 
policies are likely to have implications for the world ethanol market.  
This paper examines how fluctuations in corn yields and gasoline prices 
influence the excess supply of U.S. corn-based ethanol, taking into account 
limitations on domestic use. We explore the impact of current policies on the mean 
and variance of export supply. To the best of our knowledge, U.S. fuel ethanol 
export potential has not been assessed analytically in the literature. Building on the 
work of McPhail and Babcock (2008), we develop a stochastic partial equilibrium 
model in which corn yield per harvested acre and the price of gasoline are variable 
and simulate excess supply adjustments in response to external shocks and changes 
in policies. The simulation model is calibrated to 2009/10 data for the corn and 
energy market.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section 
summarizes current major U.S. biofuel policies. The current market situation is 
discussed in section 3. We present our partial equilibrium model and assumptions in 
section 4. In section 5, the results of simulations are presented and discussed. The 
final section summarizes our conclusions and their implications. 
 
2.  Current U.S. Biofuel Policies 
The principal current U.S. policies for ethanol include a tax credit for 
blenders, tariffs on imports, and mandates for biofuel use. Fuel blenders can claim a 
tax credit for blending biofuels with petroleum-based fuels. Presently, the Federal 
ethanol tax credit (Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit) is 45 cents per gallon. 
Import tariffs consist of a 2.5% ad valorem tariff and a secondary specific tariff of 54 
cents per gallon. Tariffs exist to offset the credit that U.S. blenders would otherwise 
receive for using imported ethanol and hence to promote the use of domestic 
supplies. On the 17th of December 2010, President Obama signed legislation 
extending the ethanol tax credit and the secondary tariff on imported ethanol for one-
year (U.S. Congress 2010, the bill HR 4940 was introduced on March 25
th 2010).  
The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), which was first established by the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 and amended by the Energy Independence and Security 
Act of 2007 (EISA, U.S. Congress, 2007), requires the use of the minimum volume 
of renewables in transportation fuel sold or introduced into commerce in the United 
States. Blenders must submit Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs), which are 
assigned to each batch of renewable fuel by a producer or importer, to the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as evidence that they comply with the RFS. 
The overall mandate, for the applicable volume of renewable fuel, requires blenders 
to incorporate 13.95 billion gallons of renewables with petroleum-based fuels in 
2011. The mandated volume rises steadily to 36 billion gallons by 2022. There are 
also secondary mandates. The advanced biofuel mandate is the largest of these and 
embraces two other mandates: the cellulosic biofuel mandate and biomass-based 
diesel mandate. The advanced biofuel mandate has to be achieved through renewable 
fuel other than corn-based ethanol. It is likely that imported sugarcane-based ethanol 
(most likely sourced from Brazil), cellulosic ethanol, and biomass-based diesel will 
be used to meet that mandate. Corn-based ethanol can be used to fill the difference 




3.  Current Market Situation 
 According to recent news reports, the U.S. ethanol industry is approaching a 
so-called blend wall, referring to the maximum amount of ethanol that can be 
blended with gasoline (Wisner, 2010). On the 21
st of January 2011, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved the use of up to 15% of ethanol 
(E15) in gasoline blends for model year 2001 and newer cars and light trucks (EPA, 
2011). Ethanol blends of up to 10% (E10) had been approved prior to this because all 
vehicles, regardless of their age, can use such blends. According to the Renewable 
Fuels Association (RFA), E15 is suitable for roughly 62 percent of the gasoline 
powered vehicles in the United States. The engines of older vehicles can be damaged 
by higher ethanol blends.  
If all eligible vehicles were to use E15, the domestic market potential for 
ethanol would be approximately 17.5 billion gallons under recent market conditions. 
Under the E10 limitation it was roughly 12.5-13.5 billion gallons (RFA, 2010a). 
However, the EPA decision may not have much immediate impact on domestic 
market potential for ethanol. To sell E15 alongside E10, the owners of service 
stations would typically have to add an additional underground tank. Otherwise they 
would need to switch their tanks over to E15. In either event, it would be expensive 
for fuel retailers to sell the product. Also, given the potential for damage to a 
significant proportion of the existing vehicle fleet, retailers could face labeling and 
misfueling issues. Since the EPA cannot force anyone to sell E15, many retailers 
may choose not to adopt the product until the fleet becomes dominated by suitable 
vehicles. Consequently, it is to be expected that the use of E15 will spread slowly. In 
addition, U.S. demand for E85 (85% ethanol) or higher ethanol blends (e.g., E20) is 
expected to remain small for the foreseeable future because of the limited number of 
vehicles that can use higher blend ratios (flex fuel vehicles) and the lack of 
infrastructure (pumps at service stations) to deliver these blends (Taheripour and 
Tyner, 2008). Thus, although the domestic demand for ethanol is expected to 
continue to increase, the growth is likely to be much lower than the U.S. has 
experienced in recent years.  
As the domestic market has become saturated, U.S. fuel ethanol exports have 
increased sharply. According to an RFA press releases (RFA, 2010c), as of the 10
th 
of December 2010, more than 325 million gallons of fuel ethanol were expected to 
be exported in 2010. Tighter supplies of sugarcane-based ethanol from Brazil due to 
high world sugar prices have contributed to a rapid increase in U.S. fuel ethanol 
exports. Even if world ethanol prices fall, exports could remain strong due to the 
limited domestic market and U.S. biofuel policies. Under the current mechanism, 
there is no restriction on the final destination of ethanol blends after blenders collect 
the tax credit. This means that potentially subsidized ethanol-gasoline blends could 
be exported to countries where these can be used. The tax credit could therefore 
stimulate ethanol exports, even if world ethanol prices fall. It is highly likely that if 
the mandated amount of biofuels under the RFS exceeds the amount that can be 
consumed domestically, the excess supply of ethanol will be diverted to international 
markets, unless the RFS mandate is waived by the EPA. 
Given this complex market situation, there is the potential that excess supply 
will be highly variable. The supply of U.S. ethanol is influenced by the price of 
feedstock (corn), the price of petroleum, as well as the height of the blend wall and 
its relationship to the RFS mandates. The supply of corn and its price can fluctuate 
sharply from year to year as a result of variations in supply, as has been illustrated by 
price movements in recent years. In addition, petroleum prices can also vary 5 
 
markedly through time. Consequently, we need a model that captures the interaction 
between the key technical and policy factors and responses in the ethanol market in 
order to examine the implications for the potential variability of ethanol exports. 
 
4.  Model Structure 
Building upon the work of McPhail and Babcock (2008), a stochastic partial 
equilibrium model is developed to evaluate the impact of policies and external 
shocks on the excess supply of corn-based ethanol. Data for the 2009/10 marketing 
year are used for model calibration. Excess supply is measured by the difference 
between the quantity of ethanol supplied domestically at the prevailing ethanol price 
in the absence of the blend wall and the maximum quantity that can be consumed 
domestically in the presence of the blend wall. If this difference is negative, excess 
supply is zero unless the mandated amount under the RFS exceeds feasible domestic 
consumption and blenders comply with the mandate. We consider two sources of 
shocks in the short-run: corn yield and gasoline prices. Variations in corn yields and 




Corn production is determined by multiplying harvested acres by corn yield 
per harvested acre 
c c
S
c y h Q ~   ,                             (1) 
where 
S
c Q  is corn production,  c h  is harvested acres, and  c y ~  represents realized yield 
per harvested acre. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) World 
Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE; USDA, 2011), harvested 
acres, corn yield and total production were 79.5 million acres, 164.7 bushels, and 
13,092 million bushels, respectively, in the 2009/10 marketing year. Following 
McPhail and Babcock (2008), corn yield is assumed to have a beta distribution. Total 
supply of corn is obtained by adding the beginning stock of corn 
BS
c Q  (1,673 million 
bushels) and the modest volume of imports 
I
c Q   (8 million bushels) to total 
production.  
Total corn demand can be decomposed into five components: feed, food, 
storage, exports, and the demand for ethanol production. All demand curves, which 
depend on the average price received by farmers in the 2009/10 marketing year, are 
assumed to be linear except for demand by the ethanol industry. 
c i i c
i i D
c p b a p g Q     ) (




,  denotes the demand of corn from food, feed, storage, or exports and c p  
represents the price of corn. Parameters for these demand curves are obtained using 
assumed demand elasticities and calibrating to USDA projections in the WASDE 
report for January 2011. The average farm price of corn c p  in the 2009/10 marketing 
year was $3.55 per bushel. Feed and residual use, food and seed use, ending stocks, 
and exports were 5,140 million bushels, 1,371 million bushels, 1,708 million bushels, 
and 1,987 million bushels, respectively. Following McPhail and Babcock (2008), the 
demand elasticities for feed, food, storage, and exports are assumed to be:  25 . 0  , 
096 . 0  ,  65 . 0  , and  6 . 0  , respectively. The demand curves in the 2009/10 
marketing year are therefore 
                                                 





c p Q    362 6425
, ,                         (3) 
c
food D
c p Q    37 1503
, ,                         (4) 
c
storage D
c p Q    313 2818
, ,                         (5) 
c
port ex D
c p Q    336 3179
, .                         (6) 
The demand for corn for ethanol 
ethanol D
c Q
,   is determined by ethanol 
production capacity, C   (billion gallons), the percentage of capacity that is in 
operation  , and the number of bushels of corn needed to produce a gallon of 
ethanol  
     C Q
ethanol D
c
, .                           (7) 
According to FAPRI (2007), the average number of gallons of ethanol produced 
from a bushel of corn is 2.75 gallons, therefore 75 . 2 / 1   .  
In the short-run, it is assumed that the capacity utilization ratio   depends on 
the current period operating margin per bushel, which is a function of the corn price 
and the ethanol price. Therefore, ethanol production capacity and production 
efficiency are fixed. According to an RFA press releases on 28
th of May 2010 (RFA, 
2010b), dry mill facilities represented nearly 90 percent of America’s total ethanol 
production in 2010. Thus, we focus on dry mill ethanol plants. Following McPhail 
and Babcock (2008), the operating margin per bushel of corn processed,  , for a dry 
mill ethanol plant can be expressed as 
44625 . 0 86055 . 0 ) 54 . 0 ( 75 . 2      c e p p  ,                   (8) 
where  e p is the price of ethanol. The demand for corn for ethanol production can be 
rewritten as 
      C p p Q e c
ethanol D
c )) , ( (
, .                       (9) 
Because the capacity utilization rate lies between zero and one, a logistic form is 
used to simulate changes in this. Hence, 




) ( ,                         (10) 
where  99259 . 0    and  96852 . 1   .  
 
Energy Market 
From equation (9), given the price of corn and the price of ethanol, the supply 
of ethanol 
S
e Q  can be written as 
C p p Q e c
S
e   )) , ( (  .                       (11) 
The demand for ethanol is assumed to be perfectly elastic at its energy value in the 
absence of the mandate and blend wall. According to de Gorter and Just (2010), the 
price of ethanol with a tax credit s and a fuel excise tax tis 
t s p p g e       ) 1 (   ,                       (12) 
where  g p is the price of gasoline and   is the fuel efficiency index which is assumed 
to be 0.68. Given the gasoline price and the corn price, ethanol supply in the absence 
of the mandate and blend wall is determined by equation (11). The average gasoline 
price in the 2009/10 marketing year was $2.70 per gallon, calculated using monthly 
data obtained from the Agricultural Marketing Resource Center (Ethanol Basis Data). 
Given the tax credit $0.45 per gallon and fuel tax $0.184 per gallon, estimated 7 
 
(expected) ethanol price from equation (12) is $2.23 per gallon. The gasoline price is 
assumed to be normally distributed. 
 
Blend wall 
The maximum volume of corn-based ethanol that can be consumed 
domestically depends on total fuel use and the RFS. The demand for mixed fuel is 
assumed to be linear 
mf mf mf mf
D
mf p b a p g Q     ) ( ,                     (13) 
where 
D
mf Q  denotes the demand of mixed fuel and  mf p is the price of mixed fuel. The 
price of mixed fuel is given by 
g e mf p p p      ) 1 (   ,                       (14) 
where   represents the share of ethanol in the total fuel mix. Since gasoline and 
ethanol are different products, if  changes, the parameters of the demand function 
also change. The feasible domestic ethanol consumption 
BW
e Q  in the presence of the 




e Q Q   .                         (15) 
If the advanced biofuel mandate is enforced and met by blenders, the maximum 
amount of corn-based ethanol that can be consumed domestically is smaller than 
BW
e Q   because it is likely that imported sugarcane-based ethanol and cellulosic 
ethanol would be used to meet the part of the advanced biofuel mandate. Hence, in 
order to obtain the ‘effective’ maximum amount of corn-based ethanol that can be 
consumed domestically, we subtract the mandated amount of advanced biofuels less 
mandated biodiesel use from 
BW
e Q . We use the term ‘effective blend wall’ for that 









e Q Q Q Q    ,                     (16) 
where 
EBW
e Q  is the effective blend wall quantity, 
RFSA
r Q  is the mandatory advanced 
biofuel use, and 
RFSA
bd Q  is the mandated biodiesel quantity which is a part of the 
advanced biofuel mandate.  
  According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), U.S. total fuel 
consumption in 2009 was 137.916 billion gallons (gasoline plus ethanol). We use 
this number in our simulations. In 2010, the domestic market potential for ethanol 
was predicted to be approximately 12.5-13.5 billion gallons (RFA, 2010a). Therefore, 
we set  09 . 0     (9%) as the most pessimistic case for domestic market use of 
ethanol. For more optimistic cases, the maximum ethanol share is assumed to be 
10 . 0    (10%) or  11 . 0    (11%). The demand curves for mixed fuel with  09 . 0   , 
10 . 0   , and  11 . 0    are 
mf
D
mf p Q    38 . 10 5 . 165  with  09 . 0   ,                   (17) 
mf
D
mf p Q    40 . 10 5 . 165  with  10 . 0   ,                   (18) 
mf
D
mf p Q    42 . 10 5 . 165  with  11 . 0   .                   (19) 
 
Excess supply of corn-based ethanol 
Given the supply of ethanol in the absence of the blend wall and the effective 










e Q , then  0 
ES
e Q . Considering current technologies and tariffs on imported 
ethanol, it is likely that corn-based ethanol would be used to achieve the total RFS 
less the advanced biofuel mandate (Thompson et al. 2009). If this mandated amount 
exceeds the effective blend wall and blenders comply with the mandate, extra corn-
based ethanol would be diverted to international markets whatever the level of world 
ethanol prices. The mandated amount less the effective blend wall volume could 
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where 
RFS
e Q  is the mandated total renewable fuel volume. The supply of ethanol in 
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Finally, the equilibrium corn price and ethanol supply without the blend wall 
and the mandate (if the mandate is binding, ethanol supply equals the mandated 
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5.  Simulation Results 
This section provides the results of simulations. Although the model 
developed in the previous section is calibrated to the 2009/10 corn and energy 
market data, we establish a baseline that incorporates potential expansion of ethanol 
production capacity. According to the Nebraska Government, as of December 2010, 
the nation’s ethanol production capacity was 13,771 million gallons (about 13.8 
billion gallons) with 840 million gallons of capacity under construction (Nebraska 
Energy Office, 2011). We assume that 50% of the capacity under construction would 
be available, resulting in a total of 14.2 billion gallons of ethanol production capacity. 
Since the RFS requirements are increasing annually, we set the mandates at their 
2011 level: the total RFS is 13.95 billion gallons, the advanced biofuel mandate is 
1.35 billion gallons, and the biomass-based diesel mandate is 0.8 billion gallons. The 
price of corn in the baseline is $3.78 per bushel. The excess supply (ethanol supply 
without the blend wall less the effective blend wall amount) is 1.37 billion gallons if 
the maximum ethanol share is 9%, and zero for other two cases (10% and 11%).  
Table 1 shows how changes in corn yield and/or gasoline price affect the 
excess supply of corn-based ethanol and the price of corn. To compare the baseline 
with various scenarios, we increase or decrease corn yield and/or gasoline price by 
10%. A 10% reduction in corn yield is consistent with the USDA WASDE 
projection for the 2010/11 marketing year. Given a gasoline price of $2.70 per gallon, 
a lower corn yield decreases the excess supply of ethanol to 0.239 billion gallons 
with  09 . 0    and increases the average corn price to $4.29 per bushels. Since corn-
based ethanol supply is less than the mandate, if blenders comply, 0.738 billion 
gallons of excess supply and a $4.47 per bushel price of corn result. Conversely, if 
corn yield is decreased by 10%, excess supply is increased significantly to 2.144 
billion gallons with  09 . 0    or 0.765 billion gallons with  10 . 0   . The price of 
corn is reduced to $2.80 per bushel. Holding corn yield at the baseline level, if the 
gasoline price falls by 10%, both excess supply and the corn price are decreased 
(0.452 billion gallons and $3.54 per bushel). If the mandate is met, a slightly higher 9 
 
excess supply and corn price will result. If the gasoline price is increased by 10%, 
both excess supply and the corn price will be increased (2.075 billion gallons and 
$3.95 per bushel). Excess supply is highest if both corn yield and the gasoline price 
increase. This is because a high corn yield reduces ethanol production costs and a 
high gasoline price increases the demand for ethanol. The price of corn is highest if 
lower yield and a higher gasoline price occur because the supply of corn will be 
tighter, whereas the demand for corn by the ethanol industry will be increased. 
Finally, if  11 . 0   , excess supply is always zero, but as discussed above, such a 
high usage rate is unlikely because E15 is unlikely to be adopted rapidly in the 
domestic market. 
Table 2 summarizes the impact of biofuel policies on the mean and 
variability of excess supply and the corn price. Using the econometric software 
package TSP 5.0 (Hall and Cummins, 2005) we generated 500 random values for 
corn yield and gasoline price, with the mean at the baseline level and the coefficient 
of variation of 0.1 for both. We consider four scenarios: only corn yield is stochastic; 
only gasoline price is stochastic; both are stochastic; and both are stochastic but the 
tax credit cannot be collected for exports. If the maximum ethanol share in total fuel 
use is 9%, the mandate increases the mean of excess supply but reduces its 
variability. This is because the mandated amount of ethanol sometimes exceeds the 
effective blend wall volume or ethanol supply without the blend wall. For  10 . 0   , 
the mandate has no impact because the effective blend wall volume is always higher 
than the mandated volume. Also, enforcement of the mandate results in higher 
variability in the corn price when corn yield fluctuates because the demand for corn 
from ethanol becomes more stable. If the tax credit is not applicable to exports, 
excess supply and the corn price will be reduced significantly. The impact of the 
RFS is the same as before. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the impacts of changes in corn yield and gasoline prices 
on the excess supply of U.S. corn-based ethanol at the prevailing ethanol price under 
various scenarios. We also explore how current U.S. biofuel policies influence the 
mean and variance of export supply. To do so, we develop a stochastic partial 
equilibrium model in which corn yield and the price of gasoline are stochastic. We 
use 2009/10 corn and energy market data for model calibration. 
Our results show that if the domestic market potential for corn-based ethanol 
in the United States is limited due to a blend wall, both corn yield and gasoline price 
have a significant impact on the excess supply of ethanol directed to world markets. 
If blenders comply with the RFS, this could exceed the maximum amount of corn-
based ethanol that can be absorbed domestically and increase the expected amount of 
excess supply, but also reduce its variability. Under the current policy mechanism, 
after blenders collect the tax credit by blending ethanol with gasoline, mixed fuels 
can be delivered anywhere and the tax credit could stimulate corn-based ethanol 
exports. The results of our simulations also show that the excess supply is greatly 
reduced if the tax credit is not applicable to exports. However, variability in excess 
supply is increased. 
Recently, the marketing of up to 15% ethanol blends (E15) was approved. 
This can be used by roughly 60% of all vehicles on the road today in the United 
States. Nevertheless, the domestic market potential for ethanol is likely to expand 
slowly. If the blend wall continues to constrain domestic consumption of blended 10 
 
fuel, current U.S. biofuel policies could have significant impact on the world ethanol 
market in the presence of fluctuations in corn yields and petroleum prices. 
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